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United States v. Nosal 
I. INTRODUCTION 
If I share my Netflix password, am I breaking the law? An act of 
Congress, passed in 1984, could be the most important law on the books to 
help answer that question. Ironically, most major companies that can 
benefit from the law did not exist at the time of its passage, like Netflix, 





 and the founding of Dell.
3
 Today, Netflix exists 
mostly in the cloud instead of in actual computers at a centralized location, 
                                                 
*
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Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2018. Associate Member, Business, 
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 R.I.P. Floppy Disc, BBC NEWS (Apr. 1, 2003), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/2905953.stm. 
2
 David Pierce, The Mac Turns 30: A Visual History (Jan. 24, 2014),  
http://www.theverge.com/2014/1/24/5340320/the-mac-turns-30-a-visual-history. 
3
 Our History, DELL,  http://www.dell.com/learn/us/en/ph/our-history (last visited June 
19, 2017). 
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as tech companies did in the 1980s. The changing innovations in computer 
technology and the usage of computers since the 80s will test the bounds 
of some United States tech laws.  
In July 2016, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on U.S. v. 
Nosal, a case that could open the floodgates for criminalizing password-
sharing. Perhaps the Ninth Circuit, more than any other circuit, has a 
special interest in protecting internet companies from password-sharing. 
The Court has jurisdiction over California, specifically Silicon Valley, the 
epicenter of technology and internet innovation. The decision in Nosal 
breaks new ground for internet litigation in Silicon Valley and has the 
potential to protect internet companies in ways that terms of service 
agreements cannot. However, in order to make the biggest gains for 
internet companies, CFAA would have to be amended to exclude the word 
“computer.” 
II. BACKGROUND OF THE CFAA 
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) may see more 
action over the next decade than it has over the past three as internet 
companies try to defend themselves against password sharing between 
members, people who pay for the product, and guests, who obtain 
2
The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review, Vol. 1 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 9
http://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/betr/vol1/iss1/9
218 
passwords without paying for the product. CFAA presents two issues for 
future courts to address. The first issue is what does “without 
authorization”4 means. The second issue, which will be more important for 
future courts, is the definition of a computer.
5
 Courts have spent a 
considerable amount of time and resources answering the first question, 
but there has been little discussion on the second. 
The CFAA states, “Whoever . . . knowingly and with intent to 
defraud, accesses a protected computer without authorization, or exceeds 
authorized access, and by means of such conduct furthers the intended 
fraud and obtains anything of value . . . shall be punished.”6 Put another 
way, “[t]he CFAA imposes criminal penalties on whoever ‘knowingly and 
with intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer without 
authorization, or exceeds authorized access, and by means of such 
conduct furthers the intended fraud and obtains anything of value [from a 
computer].’”7 
                                                 
4




 Nosal v. U.S., 844 F.3d 1024, 1024 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2008). 
7
 Id. at 1024 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012)) (emphasis original). 
3
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Originally, the 1984 CFAA targeted “hackers who accessed 
computers to steal information or to disrupt or destroy computer 
functionality.”8 The act was amended in 1986 to deter and protect against 
certain high-tech crimes or against a scheme to defraud.
9
 The act does not 
define what “without authorization” means.10 If “without authorization” 
means “without consent,” then criminal liability will expand to anyone 
who, in any way, exceeds the bounds of their contracted use. If “without 
authorization” means “a substantial breach of pre-existing authorization,” 
criminal liability will contract. 
To respond to the first problem, two questions naturally arise: do 
members exceed their authorized access by password sharing? Are guests 
unauthorized? Both of these questions are briefly addressed in the 
CFAA,
11
 but neither the statute nor case law has provided a clear answer. 
Orin Kerr, perhaps, best summarizes unauthorized access in his 2015 
article calling it “norms-driven.”12 He explained that computer laws 
                                                 
8
 Id. at 1032 (citing LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1129(9th Cir. 2009). 
9
 Id. (quoting S. REP. 99-432 at 4(1986)). 
10
 Id. at 1033. 
11
 Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98-473, § 2102(a), 98 Stat. 2190 (1984). 
12
 Orin Kerr, Norms of Computer Trespass, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1154 (2016). 
4
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should parallel trespass laws in terms of unauthorized access.
13
 Since the 
publication of his article, U.S. v. Nosal was decided, which muddied an 
attempt to clearly define unauthorized access. 
Finally, LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka
14
 outlined the limitations 
of CFAA in 2009 for the Ninth Circuit. Brekka involved a former 
employee, his wife, and two consulting businesses.
15
 Mr. Brekka, 
Defendant, emailed documents from his work email to his own personal 
computer, and to his wife’s.16 After his employment terminated, Mr. 
Brekka was still able to log onto the LVRC website.
17
 LVRC sued Mr. 
Brekka for violating CFAA.
18
 In order to violate CFAA, Mr. Brekka must 
be shown to have, 
(1) accessed a protected computer, (2) without 
authorization or exceeding such authorization that was 
granted, (3) knowingly and with intent to defraud, and 
thereby (4) furthered the intended fraud and obtained 
anything of value causing (5) a loss to one or more persons 




                                                 
13
 Id. at 1146-47. 
14
 LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009). 
15
 Id. at 1128. 
16
 Id. at 1129-30.  
17




 Id. at 1132. 
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The court first addressed what “without authorization” meant.20 
They concluded that, “[n]o language in the CFAA supports LVRC's 
argument that authorization to use a computer ceases when an employee 
resolves to use the computer contrary to the employer's interest.”21 In 
other words, access must be unequivocally revoked in order to meet this 
element. In Brekka, Plaintiff failed to show this element.
22
 
The court next addressed the lack of evidence that Mr. Brekka, in 
fact, logged into LVRC’s computer after his employment was 
terminated.
23
 This issue need not be addressed in this paper, as lack of 
evidence was not an issue discussed in Nosal.
24
 
III. THE INSTANT DECISION 
Nosal extends Brekka by defining the boundaries of CFAA with 
regard to password sharing. In Nosal, the court focused heavily on 
whether this access “exceeds authorization” under CFAA.25 However, the 
court neglected to distinguish the legal difference between unauthorized 
                                                 
20
 Id.  
21
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access to a computer and unauthorized access to a website.
26
 This 
omission will test our legal system as future cases wrestle with the legal 
limits of password sharing. Until tech companies lobby for an amendment 
to the CFAA to include the cloud, it will be hard to argue that there is 
unauthorized access to a computer. 
IV. FACTS AND HOLDING 
In Nosal, a former employee of a company accessed that 
company’s computers after his termination.27 While employed, Defendant 
was given a password.
28
 His credentials, however, were revoked after his 
termination.
29
 The employee disregarded the revocation and accessed the 
computers through the passwords he had obtained.
30
 Beyond the 
employee’s own personal access, he also gave passwords to the 
company’s computers to other non-employees.31 Those other individuals 
had been competing for business against LVRC.
32
 The non-employees 




 Id. at 1029. 
28








 Id.  
7
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then downloaded trade secrets from the computer.
33
 A dispute arose over 
what “without authorization” meant in the confines of CFAA.34 The Court 
concluded,“‘without authorization’ is an unambiguous, non-technical term 
that, given its plain and ordinary meaning, means accessing a protected 
computer without permission.”35 
Further, access restrictions and use restrictions are distinct. The 
court reasoned that the “‘exceeds authorized access’ prong of § 1030(a)(4) 
of the CFAA ‘does not extend to violations of [a company's] use 
restrictions.’”36 In other words, the court distinguished between the 
amount of information accessed and the amount of information obtained. 
Once the information is obtained, its use is outside CFAA.
37 38
  
To address some of the criticism from amici briefs of the 
criminalization of password sharing, the court turns to password sharing. 
The Court dismissed concerns about password sharing by stating, “this 
appeal is not about password sharing. Nor is it about violating a company's 




 Id. at at 1033.  
35
 Id. at 1028 (emphasis added).  
36
 Id. at 1029 (citing U.S. v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 863 (9th Cir. 2012)). 
37
 Id.  
38
 Id. The Court then addressed other counts relating to corporate espionage. Those issues 
will not be discussed in this article. 
8
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internal computer-use policies.”39 The majority criticized dissenting 
opinions that “spin hypotheticals about the dire consequences of 
criminalizing password sharing.”40 The majority does not further address 
the issue of password sharing as it relates to the Defendant’s actions.  
Instead of making password sharing  the central issue, “the conduct 
at issue is that of Nosal and his co-conspirators, which is covered by the 
plain language of the statute.”41 But the Court defines said conduct as, 
“conspiring with former [company] employees whose user accounts had 
been terminated, but who nonetheless accessed . . . a proprietary database 
through the back door when the front door had been firmly closed.”42 
Defendant “blatantly circumvented the affirmative revocation of his 
computer system access.”43 In other words, because Nosal went so far 
beyond his access formerly permitted by his employer, there could be no 
question of exceeding authorized access. The court does not help 
determine how excessive the violation of authorization was. 
                                                 
39
 Id.  
40
 Id.  
41
 Id.  
42
 Id.  
43
 Id.  
9
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At this point, the majority blurs the line between a “database” and 
a “computer system.”44 The court does not address which moment defined 
the prohibited conduct in CFAA: accessing the computer system or 
accessing the database. In Nosal, both issues were created because of 
password sharing.
45
 The difference between a computer system and a 
database is significant. 
When accessing a computer or a computer system, the implication 
is that there is a physical computer with information stored to it. In 1984 
and 1986, there was little question about what constituted a computer. 
Telephones were not computers. Televisions were not computers. Video-
game consoles were not computers. Today, that question is much more 
confusing, as the technology in an average smartphone contains far-
superior computing power than almost any 1986 computer.
46
 As this 
                                                 
44
 Id.  
45
 See generally id. 
46
 Compare iPhone Models, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/iphone/compare/ (last visited 
June 19, 2017). Today’s iPhones have finger print sensors, 2gb of RAM, and a minimum 
of 16gb of storage. Product Fact Sheet, IBM, https://www-
03.ibm.com/ibm/history/exhibits/pc25/pc25_fact.html (last visited June 19, 2017). The 
IBM AT was largely seen as the “best” computer of the early 1980’s. Its specs included 
the inferior 40K ROM (equivalent to today’s RAM), and up to 160kb of user storage per 
disc. It weighed 17 pounds. Id. 
10
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article will later discuss, the difference is a fact-specific one, the 
liberalness of construing what a computer is will expand criminal liability. 
V. COMMENT 
A.  Problems with the Majority Opinion 
The majority too quickly dismisses password sharing. It states that 
the problem is the access, not the fact that passwords were shared.
47
 The 
majority opinion offers no help in describing the role password sharing 
played in violating CFAA. The court explains that LVRC Holdings LLC v. 
Brekka
48
 and Nosal are substantially similar.
49
 Both cases involved an 
individual who had gained unauthorized access to a computer.
50
 However, 
Brekka did not address password sharing.
51
 Had passwords not been 
shared in Nosal, there would have been no unauthorized access gained. 
The majority wants to distinguish the fact that passwords were shared with 
the fact that passwords were used.
52
 
The majority’s argument on this point is purely semantic. If A 
gives a key to a protected vault to person B, an unauthorized entrant, and 
                                                 
47
 Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1029. 
48
 LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009). 
49




 Id.  
52
 See generally id. 
11
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B gets into the vault, both A and B have committed a crime. A has 
exceeded his authorized access, by sharing the key, and B has gained 
unauthorized access, by using the key. The majority argues that simply 
telling another person your password to an unauthorized computer does 
not violate CFAA.
53
 But the implication behind password sharing is that 
the password is shared so that it can be used. Sharing the key alone carries 
no crime, but as soon as the key is used, the access is unauthorized. 
The moment CFAA was violated does not change whether Nosal 
has to do with password sharing. In fact, password sharing is at the heart 
of the case. The majority even recounts that “password sharing was 
prohibited by a confidentiality agreement that [Company] required each 
new employee to sign.”54 Still, the Court concluded that Nosal is not about 
password sharing.
55
 Thus, the breach of that agreement, or the use of 
password sharing, set Nosal’s criminal liability in motion. In Nosal, 
password sharing and unauthorized access are intimately connected and 
dismissing them in one sentence does not help outline potential criminal 




 Id. at 1031. 
55
 Id. at 1029. 
12
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liability in password sharing. In fact, the Court opens the door for this 
issue for future cases. 
B.  Problems with the Dissent 
The dissent fears the criminalization of “consensual password 
sharing.”56 In other words, the majority glosses over how it distinguishes 
Nosal’s facts from consensual password sharing.57 The dissenting justice 
notes, “[p]eople frequently share their passwords, notwithstanding the fact 
that websites and employers have policies prohibiting it.”58 He continues 
by saying that the CFAA does not make the millions of people who 
password share into federal criminals even though the majority may think 
so.
59
 In the original appeal of Mr. Nosal’s conduct, Nosal I, the Court had 
rejected turning the CFAA into a “sweeping Internet-policing mandate” 
instead of maintaining its “focus on hacking.”60 CFAA was never meant to 
police the Internet; instead, CFAA was intended to stop hackers from 
taking information from computers.
61
 Both the Second Circuit and the 
                                                 
56
 Id. at 1031.  
57




 Id. at 1048 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).  
60
 Id.  
61
 Id.  
13
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Fourth Circuit have agreed with the Nosal dissent on this point.
62
 




However, the dissent has its shortfall because it misunderstands 
“authorized access,” which implies non-consent. The dissent notes, “The 
majority does not provide . . . a workable line which separates the 
consensual password sharing in this case from the consensual password 
sharing of millions of legitimate account holders, which may also be 
contrary to the policies of system owners.”64 The dissent focuses on the 
norms of computer and Internet use.
65
 This line of logic does not disprove 
the majority’s point on its own. The court had the power to criminalize 
Nosal’s behavior because his acts were without consent because his 
credentials had been revoked.
66
 
This point is where a company, like Netflix, should be on high 
alert. Netflix’s Terms of Service are unequivocal: 
                                                 
62
 Id. at 1048-49. (quoting U.S. v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 526–28 (2d Cir. 2015)); WEC 
Carolina Energy Sols. LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 204 (4th Cir. 2012)).  
63
 Id. at 1049. 
64
 Id.  
65
 Id.  
66
 Id. at 1038. 
14
The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review, Vol. 1 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 9
http://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/betr/vol1/iss1/9
230 
Netflix grants you (which, for purposes of this License 
Agreement, shall include members of your immediate 
household for whom you will be responsible hereunder and 
users of the Netflix ready device with which you are 
accessing the Netflix service and for whom you will be 




Netflix users who share their password, the dissent would argue, 
engage in a harmless and ubiquitous act.
68
 This harmless and ubiquitous 
act should not be criminalized simply because millions of people engage 
in this behavior. The dissenting justice calls this “consensual password 
sharing.”69 Instead of calling it consensual, I will refer to this password 
sharing as normal password sharing because consensual cannot be 
unauthorized by definition. However, normal password sharing could be 
unauthorized explicitly by contract. 
According to the dissent, normal password sharing is not 
criminalized under the CFAA because society expects it.
70
 In this respect, 
technology law can be similarly viewed with property law. As is the case 
with implied easements, after a certain amount of time, a normal trespass 
                                                 
67
 Nᴇᴛʟɪx Eɴᴅ Usᴇʀ Aɢʀᴇᴇᴍᴇɴᴛ, https://help.netflix.com/legal/eula?locale=en (last visited 
Apr. 11, 2017).  
68
 Nosal v. U.S. 844 F.3d 1024, 1048 (9th Cir. 2016). 
69
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can, and should, become legal.
71
 When there is enough password-sharing 
that a company should be aware of the activity, but does nothing, there 
should be a pseudo-implied easement.
72
 The problem is that none of the 
facts in Nosal suggest that Nosal’s access to the computers at his former 
company was consented to either explicitly or impliedly. 
Ultimately, although the dissent is rooted in better logic than the 
majority, and will eventually be on the right side of history as a matter of 
policy, it misses the mark in the instant case. The dissent’s fears are valid, 
but the law is clear. 
C.  Why the Majority Got It Right for the Wrong Reasons and 
the Dissent Got It Wrong for the Right Reasons 
 
In the instant case, Nosal exceeded authorized access to a 
computer by using and distributing passwords beyond his own 
eligibility.
73
 The majority, seeing the fear that millions of consensual 
password sharers would have, tried to brush aside password sharing and 
hastily swept the issue aside.
74
 But, whether the majority wants to admit it 
or not, the instant case revolves around the fact that passwords were 
                                                 
71
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDEs § 2.1 (AM. L. INST. 2016). 
72
 Kerr, supra note 13, at 1151-52 (calling this phenomenon an implied license). 
73
 Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1029.  
74
 See generally id. 
16
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shared which led to unauthorized access to a computer.
75
 The password 
sharing alone was not enough to create criminal liability. The subsequent 
use of those passwords created criminal liability. Thus, Nosal did violate 
the CFAA. The majority needs to clarify that password sharing, followed 
by the use of the shared password, is a criminal act in the Ninth Circuit. 
The majority was quick to dismiss a multitude of amicus briefs,
76
 but the 
court followed the law to its logical conclusion: password sharing can be 
criminal if the sharer exceeded authorized access.
77
 
The majority made the right decision because password sharing is 
one method of obtaining unauthorized access to a computer. An individual 
or companies gains information from a computer that they could not have 
otherwise had through exceeding authorized access or, similarly, through 
means that were not authorized at all. Nosal did access a computer without 
authorization, or his authorization had effectively expired, and stole 
information to the computer owner’s detriment.78 Had the majority 
stopped here, they probably could have won over the dissent. The majority 
                                                 
75
 Id. at 1029. 
76




 Id. at 1029. 
17
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opened the door for new litigation because they stated, “Nosal is charged 
with unauthorized access—getting into the computer after categorically 
being barred from entry.”79 However, everyone who does not buy a 
membership to a website is categorically barred from entry.
80
 If they 
obtain the benefits of membership to the website, they have exceeded 
authorized access. The court found that Nosal had unauthorized access and 
proceeded to share that access.
81
 Nosal committed a crime on two fronts, 
under the law. 
Yet, even though the dissenting judge comes to the wrong 
outcome, he does so for a very good reason. The judge is reasonable to 
fear the criminalization of millions of harmless and ubiquitous acts.
82
 
However, this concern is not critical to the issue at hand. Nosal stole trade 
secrets from a company.
83
 This type of behavior is exactly what CFAA 
was trying to protect against.
84
 When a person checks their personal email 
at work, which may technically exceed the granted authorization from a 
                                                 
79
 Id. at 1034. 
80
 NETFLIX TERMS OF USE (2016) ( “[T]he Account Owner should not reveal the 
password to anyone”). 
81
 Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1036. 
82
 Id. at 1048-49 (Reinhardt, J. dissenting). 
83
 Id. at 1029. 
84
 Id. at 1032. 
18
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computer’s owner, they are not accessing information specific to the 
owner. 
By looking back at the 1984 legislation, this is a simple logical link 
as the Internet was in its infant stage. In 1984, computers had files on them 
that needed to be protected. Today, those files could exist in cyberspace or 
the cloud. The 1984 Congress, if reexamining the issue today, should have 
no trouble distinguishing stealing trade secrets from harmlessly checking 
email. But, even if this logic is unconvincing, the text of CFAA provides 
the mens rea terms “knowingly and with intent to defraud.”85 A person 
cannot both ubiquitously share their password yet possess the intent to 
defraud.
86
 The courts could not reasonably interpret the statute as 
criminalizing an act that countless people engage in. 
The mens rea standard in CFAA makes criminalizing password 
sharing a bit easier to swallow. When a person checks his or her personal 
email on a work computer, and a company policy forbids it, they do not 
intend to defraud the company because their behavior is seemingly 
                                                 
85
 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012). 
86
 Fraud, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A knowing misrepresentation or 
knowing concealment of a material fact made to induce another to act to his or her 
detriment. • Fraud is usu[ally] a tort, but in some cases [esp[ecially] when the conduct is 
willful] it may be a crime”). 
19
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harmless. Two people, using a single account, do not cause a great deal of 
harm to a company like Netflix. By contrast, if a person intentionally puts 
a worm or a virus onto a computer, it can be said that they are defrauding 
the company by abusing their authorized access. 
Further, many of the dissent’s concerns could be quelled if sharing 
a password to a website is probably not covered by CFAA. As previously 
mentioned, CFAA is explicit in its use of the word computer,
87
 which is 
now antiquated. The dissent is quick to note that point.
88
 
“A protected computer is defined as a computer affected by or 
involved in interstate commerce—effectively all computers with Internet 
access . . . nearly all desktops, laptops, servers, smart-phones, as well as 
any iPad, Kindle, Nook, X-box, [and] Blu-Ray player.”89 What a computer 
means will be addressed in section V. However, it is important to note that 
CFAA does have its limits. By explicitly stating computer, CFAA might 
not include servers or other massive data storage systems on its face. 
                                                 
87
 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012). 
88
 Nosal, 844 F.3d 1024 at 1050. 
89
 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
20
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Specifically, CFAA does not pertain to the cloud
90
 on its face. It would 
seem that password sharing on Netflix
91
 is probably not covered by 
CFAA; however, the framework exists for criminal liability. 
VI. REDEFINING AND CHANGING ESSENTIAL TERMS IN CFAA 
The courts cannot get around the fact that the law says 
“computers.”92 A narrow interpretation of computer would suggest that 
this means a physical, technological device, the primary function of which 
is to keep and store digital data. A broader view could make the argument 
for other devices to count as computers. Tablets could certainly qualify as 
a computer because of their computational power as well as functionality. 
However, courts cannot evade the fact that a computer is a physical 
device. Thus, a website is not a computer. An issue arises below the 
surface. Although websites are not themselves computers, they are backed 
by computers on the ground. Because of the nature of the cloud, an 
                                                 
90
 The Cloud is a series of interconnected servers that hold digital data which can be 
accessed wirelessly. Jess Fee, The Beginner’s Guide to the Cloud, MASHABLE, (Aug. 26, 
2013), http://mashable.com/2013/08/26/what-is-the-cloud/#lyMN6qjsvkqA. 
91
 Whose movies stream from the cloud. 
92
 Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1033-34. 
21
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interconnected system of computers, once information is accessed on a 
website, access to its storage system is also gained.
93
 
Thus, a website can be so closely tied to database, that they can be 
seen as one and the same. If access to information is like entering a 
house,
94
 the website is the front door. A website allows the individual to 
access stored information too great for the website alone to handle. Thus, 
websites necessarily link back to other computers that actually store the 
data. 







 are all databases. Dropbox 
holds digital data. Spotify is a database for music. Netflix is a database for 
movies. Thus, the distinction between computer systems and databases 
may seem unimportant when regulating rudimentary access to websites, 
but can be the difference between criminality and contract liability in 
                                                 
93
 Jess Fee, The Beginner’s Guide to the Cloud, MASHABLE (Aug. 26, 2013), 
http://mashable.com/2013/08/26/what-is-the-cloud/#lyMN6qjsvkqA. 
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password sharing for websites. Contract liability will be discussed more 
fully in the conclusion. For now, it is important to note that violating a 
contract, by exceeding its terms, can lead to liability. 
If the courts automatically interpret unauthorized access to a 
website to mean unauthorized access to a database, there are serious 
ramifications for Netflix and its users. A website alone is not a database, 
but it is connected to one. Thus, in order to gain “anything of value,”98 the 
final element of the CFAA necessitates access to a database, thus 
computers. Tricking a website into giving access to a database would 
create liability under CFAA. Before any cases can move forward, 
Congress should seriously consider the definition of a computer, what 
unauthorized access means, and what “anything of value” means. 
Redefining computer so that it best fits for the modern age is 
important, but not essential for violations under the CFAA. As it sits, the 
CFAA could easily be construed to mean that every time a person accesses 
a website to view a file, listen to music, or watch a movie without 
authorization, they have committed a federal crime no matter what the 
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medium. Hackers can target cell phones, Xboxes, and even thermostats.
99
 
Accessing a video game system and accessing a corporate computer 
should not be treated as equals under criminal law. Accessing a video 
game in order to play it for free carries a minimal impact when compared 
to accessing a corporation’s secret files. By outlining the parameters of a 
computer, exactly what kind of unauthorized access is worthy of criminal 
liability will become clear. 
The best approach would be abandoning CFAA because its 
original intent has been lost. Instead of hacking, any kind of intended 
unauthorized access to a database exposes criminal liability. In 1984, the 
only way to hack digital information was through a physical computer, 
and all computers were fundamentally similar.
100
 Obviously, the damage 
that a hacker can do to a digital thermostat is different than the damage 
they can do by hacking a corporate computer. On the one hand, the hacker 
can gain sensitive information about individuals and corporate secrets, 
while on the other, he or she can ruin an electric bill. Further, access to a 




 By comparison to a cellphone, a video game console, a laptop, and a thermostat in 
2016. 
24





 can lead to unauthorized access to movies or music, which have 
a relatively small devastating effect on society. It would be prudent for 
Congress to give a clearer meaning to, or change, the phrase “anything of 
value” as it is used in CFAA. Redefining “anything of value” would help 
ease the dissent’s concerns in Nosal because Congress could be explicit in 
prohibiting the societally harmful behaviors associated with hacking. 
Netflix has made “anything of value” more tangible under the CFAA. In 
November 2016, Netflix announced that it would allow members to 
download movies.
102
 Being able to download movies will make a more 
tangible economic harm to tie liability to. 
The unauthorized access issue is still a problem, but changing what 
a computer means as well as rephrasing “anything of value” would help 
future courts understand the bounds of unauthorized access. Congress 
could simply clarify that unauthorized access” means access that either 
exceeds express or implied authorization to satisfy the concerns of normal 
password sharing the dissent focused on. 
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VII. FUTURE PROBLEMS WITH PASSWORD SHARING 
There still may be one issue in CFAA that will prevent liability. 
CFAA includes a mens rea element. Neither the majority nor the dissent in 
Nosal brought up the mens rea issue. As Orin Kerr correctly observed, 
“computer trespass statutes generally require that the user commit an 
intentional or knowing unauthorized access.”103 Criminal liability under 
CFAA requires a hacker “intentionally access a computer without 
authorization” or intentionally “exceeding authorized access.”104 As it is 
the government’s job to prove mens rea, this is a serious limitation to 
actual convictions.  
The mens rea requirement, with respect to lack of authorization, 
could mean the intent to access the computer or the intent to access the 
information creates criminal liability. This difference is important, but still 
remains an unanswered question through Nosal. If the element of 
exceeding authorized access is met simply at the moment the computer 
was logged into, then the first element is automatic. It is impossible to 
gain information from a computer without accessing it. If the second 
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interpretation is true, that the element is met when the hacker obtains the 
data, the flow of logic is more clear. The elements could be sorted as 
follows: (1) an unauthorized person; (2) intentionally; (3) gains access to 
anything of value; (4) on a targeted computer. 
By organizing the elements in this way, courts have a clearer 
understanding of what constitutes a crime under CFAA. The Nosal 
majority focused heavily on the fact that a computer was accessed without 
authorization at the initial login.
105
 This is a problem because the element 
is automatic, and the authors of the CFAA probably did not intend such an 
interpretation because their focus was on hacking.
106
 The fact that a 
computer was accessed is not the problem. The information accessed is the 
problem. The fact that the information was on a computer should be an 
additional step. This step is important when two actors are in play. 
Password sharing is a unique issue because it requires two actors: 
the person who accesses the information, and the sharer. Sharing your 
password and logging on could easily be seen as trespassing on Netflix’s 
website to provide you with content you should have otherwise paid for, 
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thus it has value. All other elements aside, the question of whether or not 
the sharer of information could be criminally liable remains unanswered. 
Under Nosal, there is strong evidence to suggest liability. It is clear that 
the person who accesses this information is liable, but what about the 
password sharer? 
The Nosal majority’s focus was on the fact that Nosal himself 
exceeded his authorized access to a computer.
107
 But if Nosal had not 
accessed the computer personally, and had only given the information to 
other people, the current holding may create criminal liability. If I were a 
prosecutor, and Nosal had not personally accessed the information, I 
would argue that Nosal is still liable under the theory that “exceeds 
authorized access” means that Nosal simply had to go beyond the limits of 
his authority in the process of accessing a computer’s valuable 
information. Nosal’s agents accessed the information.108 He did that by 
handing over passwords to other people, enabling their unauthorized 
access, and exceeding his own authorized access.
109
 Nosal does not 
personally have to gain the access to the computer itself under this theory, 
                                                 
107
 Id. at 1032.  
108
 Id. at 1034. 
109
 Id. at 1037. 
28
The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review, Vol. 1 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 9
http://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/betr/vol1/iss1/9
244 
just the data. As I noted above, the real crime cannot come at the moment 
that the computer itself was breached, it has to come once the valuable 
information was obtained. Thus, Nosal, a person who exceeded his 
authority, and thus is unauthorized, intentionally gained access to 
information that was contained on a computer. 
Now, the dissent’s concerns should be ringing out. If all password 
sharing is criminalized, then millions of people who share their passwords 
are criminally liable.
110
 At face value, this is true. When a Netflix 
password is shared to a person that does not live in the same household as 
the member, he or she is a criminal under CFAA. The hacker has 
knowingly taken unauthorized access to something of value, such as 
movie rentals, from a computer, through Netflix’s website, and thus the 
servers it runs on, which are computers. Further, as explained previously, 
the sharer of the password is also criminally liable. So, sharing a password 
to a website can trigger criminal liability under CFAA. Opponents to 
Nosal’s interpretation of CFAA would most likely prefer that the act 
clarify that the accessed computer was targeted. Thus, someone 
specifically gained unauthorized access to a single computer that 
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contained information of value because that targeted computer contained 
something of value. But even with this change, “something of value” is so 
vague that virtually any access to any one computer could be seen as 
valuable, which millions of people do. 
Societal norms must be taken into consideration when evaluating 
criminal liability under CFAA. The dissent correctly notes that in the past, 
the Ninth Circuit “emphatically refused to turn violations of use 
restrictions imposed by employers or websites into crimes under the 
CFAA, declining to put so many citizens at the mercy of [their] local 
prosecutor.”111 It is inarguable that many people share passwords 
regularly. The concerns an employer has in protecting its websites are 
serious, and some acts can trigger criminal liability under CFAA. 
However, not all unauthorized access should trigger should liability. The 
dissent notes that these cases would cause the public to be at the mercy of 
their prosecutor.
112
 Even the Huffington Post commented on Nosal’s effect 
on sharing passwords.
113
 Ultimately, the article concluded that it would be 
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unreasonable for Netflix or similar carriers to seek criminal action against 
users who share their passwords.
114
 Punishment for such a crime would be 
arbitrarily given. 
The immediate decision does not take into consideration societal 
norms. Although there are no estimates as to how many people actually 
share their passwords and account information, an outbreak exists. The 
dissent suggests that “millions”115 of people share passwords, which is a 
safe estimate. Assuming that estimate is accurate, it seems implausible for 
a company to not know that password sharing exists. In January 2016, the 
CEO of Netflix went so far as to say he had no problem with password 
sharing.
116
 When the CEO admits that he sees no problem, the password 
sharing is normal because it happens so frequently. Netflix’s stock has 
been soaring over the last five years. Shares of Netflix stock closed 2011 
at $9.90.
117
 On October 28
th
, 2016, the stock opened just shy of $127.
118
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password sharing is hurting Netflix, the stock price certainly does not 
reflect the pain. 
But even if password sharing is stunting Netflix’s growth, the act 
should not be criminal for efficiency purposes. Password sharing should 
be viewed in light of a contract dispute, not as criminal liability. This is 
because a contract dispute resolves in putting the injured party in the 
position they would be if the contract had been fully performed or had the 
contract never been entered into.
119
 When a member of Netflix goes 
beyond her license, she is in breach. Netflix can seek remedies that would 
compensate for its economic loss. Contract law would increase efficiency 
for Netflix in this case. 
By contrast, criminal law seeks to punish wrongdoers, thus 
decreasing utility for both parties. Netflix does not benefit from putting its 
customers in jail. I can’t imagine that inmates are allowed their own 
Netflix accounts. Netflix could lose customers and would create a public 
relations nightmare. The company could not defend seeking criminal 
charges against a high volume of customers. Unlike contract, criminal 
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liability decreases efficiency across the board. From an efficient market 
prospective, contract remedies make the most sense. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Although the facts in Nosal were substantially dissimilar to normal 
password sharing, the Ninth Circuit will continue to be challenged by 
cases that inch closer to normal password sharing. The majority was 
correct in the instant case, but their correct decision rightfully creates 
worry and shows a deeper problem in the congressional act. There could 
be millions of criminals at large for engaging in a ubiquitous activity. 
Further, contract law solves the problem more efficiently than criminal 
law. Criminal liability turns on what a company authorizes to its members. 
Thus, activity on one website (with a well crafted Terms of Service 
Agreement) could create criminal liability, where another website (with a 
poorly crafter Terms of Service Agreement) would not. There is no 
universal standard for criminal liability. As the elements sit from the Nosal 
decision, it is hard to believe that password sharing escapes criminal 
liability under CFAA at face value limited only by arbitrary distinctions 
between Terms of Service Agreements. 
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